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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT-DEFENDANT 
Appellant First Interstate Bank of Utah, formerly 
named Walker Bank & Trust Company (hereinafter referred to as 
the "Bank"), respectfully submits this Reply Brief in answer 
to the new matters set forth in the brief of plaintiff-
respondent Kenneth L. Rothey as Trustee of the Belnap Family 
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Trust (hereinafter referred to as "Rothey"). As in its 
Brief, the Bank will refer to the governing documents as 
follows: The promissory note evidencing the Bank's May 13, 
1963, loan of $30,000.00 to Utahna P. Belnap is the "Note", 
and the trust deed securing the Note is the "Trust Deed"; 
the two lawsuits brought by LeGrande L. Belnap during the 
probate of the estate of Utahna P. Belnap which attacked the 
validity of his wife's title to the property covered by the 
Trust Deed and the Trust Deed itself are referred to as the 
"Actions". 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT SHOULD BE 
AFFIRMED BASED ON PRINCIPLES 
OF RES JUDICATA 
A. Rothey has not Cross-Appealed 
and is Consequently Barred from Con-
tending that the Trial Court Erred in 
Rejecting Rothey's Res Judicata Defense. 
The Bank has appealed from the trial court's judg-
ment that, due to the Bank's alleged failure timely to advise 
Rothey or his predecessors of certain attorney's fees and 
costs incurred in the Actions, the Bank is estopped from 
collecting such fees as a part of the obligation secured by 
the Trust Deed. (Conclusions No. 6 and 7; R. 348). The 
Bank's Brief is largely concerned with demonstrating that the 
theory created by the trial court was neither pleaded nor 
argued by Rothey, that the trial court's theory is contrary 
to law and good sense, that no evidence supports the trial 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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court's findings, and that the trial court made no finding, 
and no evidence establishes the essential requirement, that 
Rothey or his predecessors relied in any respect upon the 
Bank's conduct. Despite the fact that the trial court 
entered judgment based on its unpleaded, unprecedented, and 
unsupported estoppel theory — and despite the fact that the 
Bank's brief necessarily concerns itself with demonstrating 
the trial court's error in relying on such a theory — Rothey 
begins Point I of his brief with the following proposition: 
"Clearly the primary thrust of the arguments of the Bank is 
that since Respondent did not specifically plead the defense 
of res judicata, there can be no bar to recovery by the Bank 
on that basis." Brief of Respondent-Plaintiff, at 11. 
Rothey then goes on to argue at length that the doctrine of 
res judicata operates to bar the Bank's recovery of the 
disputed attorney's fees. Ld., at 11-17. Rothey's attempt 
to circumvent the real issue in this case is unavailing. 
Rothey concedes that, in violation of the explicit 
command of Rule 8(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, he never 
pleaded res judicata as an affirmative defense in this case. 
Brief of Respondent-Plaintiff, at 11. The best that Rothey 
can state is that he "did plead facts constituting res judi-
cata. " Id. In fact, however, Rothey's reply to the Bank's 
Rothey's emphasis, as a basis for affirmance, on a theory 
rejected by the trial court, is peculiar, but understandable. 
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counterclaim, (R. 78-81), can be searched in vain for any 
theory even remotely resembling the res judicata argument 
that Rothey now urges. Similarly, Rothey failed to identify 
this theory when asked by interrogatory to "state each fact 
supporting or providing the basis for the allegations" 
contained in his defenses to the Bank's counterclaim. (R. 
152-154). Accordingly, when Rothey attempted to present his 
res judicata theory at trial, the Bank interposed a 
continuing objection. (T., 2/7/83, at 107-108; R. 478; T., 
2/8/83, at 91-92; R. 587-588). The trial court ultimately 
agreed with the Bank's objection to Rothey's attempt to raise 
his res judicata defense and, after both parties had 
presented their evidence, ruled as follows: 
It would have been wisdom on my part and 
would have saved wear and tear on the 
Court and wear and tear on the court 
reporter and expense to your clients when 
you appeal my order to the Supreme Court 
to have announced that this is not a case 
of res judicata, there having been no 
affirmative defense raised and the Court 
not having received a motion nor granted 
a motion about res judicata. 
(T., 2/8/83, at 118; R. 614) (emphasis added). Thus, the 
trial court expressly ruled that Rothey had not raised the 
affirmative defense of res judicata and that that defense 
could not be considered. 
Under these circumstances, Rothey cannot now be 
heard to support the trial court's ruling on the basis of an 
affirmative defense which the trial court expressly rejected. 
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The absence of a cross-appeal from Rothey challenging that 
finding of the trial court precludes Rothey from making such 
an argument here. 
Walters v. First Federal Savings and Loan Associ-
ation of Phoenix, 131 Ariz. 32, 641 P.2d 235 (1982), is 
directly on point. The plaintiffs in that case sued defen-
dant for damages in connection with the purchase of an apart-
ment complex. The plaintiffs had been involved in a previous 
lawsuit involving the same apartment complex. The plaintiffs 
were unsuccessful in that prior lawsuit. The jury in the 
second lawsuit returned a verdict in favor of the defendant 
and the plaintiffs appealed. On appeal, the defendant argued 
at length, apparently relying on the fact of the plaintiffs1 
loss in the prior lawsuit, that the plaintiffs1 claims were 
barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The Arizona 
Supreme Court rejected the defendant's argument and stated as 
follows: 
At the outset, we reject [the defen-
dant's] contention, argued at length and 
repeated numerous times throughout its 
brief, that all of plaintiffs' substan-
tive claims are barred by the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel. We do not reach the 
merits of this defense because [the 
defendant] should have raised this con-
tention by way of a cross-appeal. 
In the absence of a cross-appeal, 
the appellee can defend only as to the 
arguments allowed in the trial court and 
cannot present rejected claims in an 
answering brief. Because [the defendant] 
seeks to assert a defense which was not 
permitted in the trial court, a cross-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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appeal should have been filed .... 
641 P.2d, at 238 (emphasis added). 
The same rule was stated by the court in Cooper v. Albu-
querque National Bank, 75 N.M. 295, 404 P.2d 125, 133 (1965): 
"[T]he rule is that findings of fact unfavorable to appellee, 
not attacked by cross-appeal, must stand." See Terry v. 
Zions Cooperative Mercantile Institution, 617 P.2d 700 (Utah 
1980); Federal Land Bank of Berkeley v. Sorenson, 101 Utah 
305, 121 P.2d 398, 401 (1942). 
Under these precedents, Rothey cannot argue, as he 
does at page 14 of his brief, "that the defense of res judi-
cata acts to bar the recovery of the disputed attorney's fees 
here at issue and that the trial court erred in not making 
such a ruling." (Emphasis added). The trial court found 
specifically that Rothey had not pleaded the defense of res 
judicata. If Rothey wishes to disagree with that finding 
before this Court, he must do so by way of a cross-appeal. 
The time for cross-appealing under Rule 75(d), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, having passed, this Court cannot properly 
consider Rothey1s challenge to the trial court's ruling. See 
Terry v. Zions Cooperative Mercantile Institution, 617 P.2d 
700 (Utah 1980). 
B. The Bank's Claim to the Attor-
ney's Fees at Issue is not Barred by the 
Doctrine of Res Judicata. 
Assuming arguendo that Rothey can properly assert 
a res judicata defense, the doctrine of res judicata has no 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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application to this case. In order for the affirmative 
defense of res judicata to succeed, its proponent must show 
(a) the existence of a prior suit between the same parties 
and (b) that the prior suit involved the same cause of 
action. Searle Brothers v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 690 (Utah 
1978). Rothey's res judicata theory fails to satisfy either 
prerequisite. Neither of the Actions were between the 
parties to this lawsuit. More importantly, neither of the 
Actions concerned a cause of action even similar to, much 
less "the same as," the issues presented in this lawsuit. 
First, for res judicata to apply, the prior action 
must be between the same parties as the parties to the pre-
sent action. Rothey does state that the parties to the 
Actions "were the same as, or in privity with, the parties to 
this action." Brief of Respondent-Plaintiff at 15-16. 
However, Rothey provides absolutely no support for this 
conclusion. The parties to the Actions (LeGrande L. Belnap 
and the Bank) are plainly not the same as the parties to this 
lawsuit (Rothey and the Bank). Rothey has not demonstrated 
the existence of any privity between LeGrande L. Belnap and 
himself. 
Rothey1s res judicata defense must also fail be-
cause the Actions did not involve the same cause of action as 
this case. The Actions "were either a direct or indirect 
attack by Mr. Belnap on either the validity of the title of 
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the reputed owner, Utahna Belnap, to the property covered by 
the Trust Deed or an attack on the integrity of the underly-
ing security document, namely the Trust Deed." (Finding No. 
4; R. 341). Neither of the Actions upon which res judicata 
is based concerned an effort to recover the amounts secured 
by the Trust Deed or to foreclose the Trust Deed, as does 
this case. Indeed, the Bank did not even have a personal 
claim against LeGrande L. Belnap for recovery of its 
attorney's fees incurred under the Trust Deed, to which Mr. 
Belnap was not a party. The Bank's only recourse, as far as 
Mr. Belnap was concerned, was against the property secured by 
the Trust Deed, in which Belnap claimed an interest. 
Furthermore, Utah's one action rule, Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 78-37-1 (Repl. 1977), would preclude an action to 
recover a personal judgment for attorney's fees secured by a 
trust deed prior to foreclosure of the trust deed itself. 
Bank of Ephraim v. Davis, 581 P.2d 1001, 1003 (Utah 1978).2 
Foreclosure of the Trust Deed would, of course, require the 
Rothey's theory of res judicata, when read in conjunction 
with the one action rule, would have the obviously incorrect 
consequence of forcing the Bank judicially to foreclose its 
Trust Deed in the Actions to recover the attorney's fees at 
issue, rather than pursuing a non-judicial trustee's sale 
procedure, which the trust deed statute explicitly allows. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 57-1-23 (Repl. 1974). 
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joinder of those holding junior interests in the subject 
property, who were not parties to the Actions, but who were 
necessarily joined as parties defendant to the Bank's 
counterclaim in this case. (R. 55, paragraph 3; R. 56, 
paragraph 10). 
The foregoing serves to highlight the ridiculous 
character of Rothey's belated and unpleaded res judicata 
defense. The Actions concerned the validity of the Trust 
Deed; this case concerns the recovery of amounts secured by 
the Trust Deed — the two are plainly different causes of 
action. The Bank's right to claim its attorney's fees 
incurred in connection with the Actions was not at issue in 
the Actions, nor is there any evidence that the Trust Deed 
should, or even could, have been foreclosed at the time of 
the Actions. 
Schaer v. State, 657 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1983), demon-
strates that res judicata is inapplicable here. The plain-
tiff in Schaer instituted suit for a declaratory judgment 
that a certain road, the "dugway road," on his property was 
highway dedicated to the public use. The State defended on 
the ground of the res judicata effect of a prior lawsuit. 
The prior lawsuit involved the same plaintiff and the State' 
condemnation of land contiguous to the dugway road. The 
trial court rejected the State's res judicata argument and 
this Court affirmed. This Court rejected the State's res 
judicata argument with the following statement: 
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[W]e have determined that res judicata is 
not applicable to the present case be-
cause it is based on a different claim, 
demand, or cause of action than that of 
the [prior] litigation. The two causes 
of action rest on a different state of 
facts and evidence of a different kind or 
character is necessary to sustain the two 
causes of action. Moreover, the evidence 
of the two causes of action relates to 
the status of the property in two com-
pletely different and separate time 
periods. Thus, the doctrine of res 
judicata does not apply to preclude the 
plaintiff from maintaining his present 
cause of action. 657 P.2d, at 1340. 
The Court's reasoning in Schaer applies here to bar Rothey's 
attempt to attach res judicata effect to the Actions. The 
Actions did not in any respect involve the Bank's right to 
recover attorney's fees under the Trust Deed or the amount of 
such fees. 
Commercial Bank of Spanish Fork v. Spanish Fork 
South Irrigation Co., 107 Utah 279, 153 P.2d 547 (1944), is 
also apposite. The dispute in that case revolved around the 
defendant irrigation company's issuance of two different 
stock certificates representing the same share in the 
company. The plaintiff, the holder of one of the certifi-
cates, first brought a mandamus action to compel the defen-
dant to issue a new certificate. The court in that action 
ruled that the plaintiff's certificate was void and conferred 
upon the holder no rights as a stockholder. The plaintiff 
brought a second suit against the defendant for the value of 
the stock purportedly represented by the void certificate. 
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The defendant defended, in part, on the ground that the prior 
mandamus action precluded the plaintiff's second action under 
the doctrine of res judicata. The trial court rejected the 
defendant's argument and this Court affirmed, stating: 
The rights claimed in this suit, although 
growing out of the same subject matter, 
gave rise to a distinct or separate cause 
of action and were not put in issue in 
the former suit. Furthermore, the ques-
tioned issues in this suit are neither 
germane to nor essentially connected with 
the actual issues raised in the mandamus-
proceedings. In such cases the doctrine" 
of res adjudicata is not applicable. 
153 P.2d, at 55T (emphasis added). 
The facts here are closely analogous to those of Commercial 
Bank. The first suit in Commercial Bank determined whether 
plaintiff was entitled to a certificate, while here the 
Actions determined that the Bank held a valid Trust Deed. 
The second suit in Commercial Bank sought damages for defen-
dant's failure properly to issue the certificate, while this 
case seeks to recover fees and costs under the now judicially 
validated Trust Deed. Res judicata is inapplicable here for 
the same reason. 
Finally, Rothey has failed to come to grips with 
the absurd consequences of his position on res judicata. In 
order to accept Rothey's argument that the Actions operate to 
bar the Bank's recovery of the attorney's fees as part of its 
foreclosure under the Trust Deed, the Court must rule that 
every time a holder of a trust deed is joined in an action 
concerning either the property covered by a trust deed or the 
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trust deed itself, he must foreclose at that time in order to 
protect his right to claim attorney's fees incurred in 
3 
connection with such an action as part of the indebtedness 
secured by the trust deed. In effect, the holder of the 
trust deed would be legally coerced into foreclosing against 
his will — a nonjudicial trustee's sale would be barred by 
res judicata. Such a preposterous result is not contemplated 
under the doctrine of res judicata. 
POINT II. 
ROTHEY'S DEFENSE OF THE TRIAL COURT'S 
JUDGMENT IS NOT PERSUASIVE 
The second portion of Rothey's Brief attempts to 
support the trial court's judgment on its own terms. Rothey 
stumbles at the outset, however, over the unarguable fact 
that he neither pleaded nor argued the estoppel theory 
created by the trial court to support its judgment. The best 
face that Rothey can put on his failure to plead or argue the 
trial court's theory is the fact that Rothey's Fourth Defense 
to the Bank's counterclaim stated as follows: 
The Defendant has waived and/or is es-
topped to claim, as a part of the fore-
closure of the subject Trust Deed and 
Trust Deed Note, the fees, costs and 
o 
Trust deeds generally provide (as did the Bank's here) that 
attorney's fees incurred by the beneficiary in defending the 
validity or priority of the trust deed in question are an 
indebtedness secured by the trust deed. 
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expenses which Defendant has claimed in 
its Counterclaim. 
(Reply to Counterclaim, Fourth Defense; R. 80, quoted at page 
19 of the brief of respondent-plaintiff)• It is true that 
Rothey utilized the word "estoppel" in his Fourth Defense. 
Rothey neglects to point out, however, that when asked by way 
of interrogatory to "[s]tate each fact supporting or 
providing the basis for the allegations contained in Fourth 
Defense of the Reply to Counterclaim herein" Rothey stated as 
follows: 
The Plaintiff relies for his Fourth 
Defense upon the fact that tender was 
made and accepted as stated in answer to 
Interrogatory No. 6 above and further 
upon the fact that the Defendant, as 
special administrator of the estate of 
Utahna P. Belnap, was entitled to seek 
the payment for all services rendered in 
that capacity as part of said proceeding. 
By reason of the fact that the Defendant 
failed to make application for reimburse-
ment for all services rendered as part of 
this proceeding Defendant is thereby 
estopped from seeking those fees as part 
of the foreclosure of the subject Trust 
Deed. 
(Answers of Plaintiff to Defendant's First Set of Inter-
rogatories No. 7; R. 153) (emphasis added). Rothey also 
fails to note that at no time prior to the trial court's 
announcement of the decision was the trial court's theory 
mentioned, considered, or conceived by any party to this 
case. 
Plainly, the estoppel theory pleaded by Rothey 
bears no relation whatsoever to the theory created by the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
trial court. The trial court ruled that the Bank was es-
topped to claim the disputed attorney's fees because it had 
failed to keep the trustor and her successors advised of the 
attorney's fees and other expenses it was incurring in its 
defense against the Actions. This unique and unprecedented 
theory has nothing to do with Rothey's defense based on the 
fact that the Bank failed to request attorney's fees in 
connection with the probate of the estate of Utahna Belnap. 
The law is clear that estoppel must be pleaded with 
particularity, and pleading one kind of estoppel does not 
permit proof of another. Kirk v. Kirk, 205 Okla. 482, 238 
P.2d 808, 810 (1951); In re Anderson's Estate, 121 Mont. 515, 
194 P.2d 621, 626-627 (1948). "Where a party seeks to raise 
an estoppel to a claim set forth in the pleadings, facts 
constituting an estoppel must be pleaded." Tracy Loan & 
Trust Co. v. Openshaw Investment Co., 102 Utah 509, 132 P.2d 
388, 391 (1942) (emphasis added). Under these clear prece-
dents, Rothey's failure either to plead or offer any proof 
with respect to the estoppel theory created by the trial 
court underscores the trial court's error. As the Court 
stated in Lagoon Co. v. Utah State Fair Association, 117 Utah 
213, 214 P.2d 614, 616 (1950), "[t]he claim of estoppel must 
fail because of the lack of pleadings and evidence to allege 
and show such a defense." 
Rothey's reliance on Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 
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205, 381 P.2d 86 (1963) (see Brief of Respondent-Plaintiff at 
20-22), to support the trial court's creative jurisprudence 
is entirely misplaced. In fact, Cheney actually supports the 
Bank's position on this issue. The Court in that case es-
chewed a crabbed or formalistic reading of the requirement of 
Rule 8(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, that affirmative 
defenses must be pleaded. The point of Rule 8(c), the Court 
stated, was notice, not a blind reliance on the pleadings. 
As the Court put it, "[w]hat they are entitled to is notice 
of the issues raised and an opportunity to meet them." 381 
P.2d, at 91. In this case, the Bank received no notice of 
the estoppel theory ultimately created by the trial court. 
Rothey never pleaded nor argued such a theory and the Bank 
had no opportunity to meet it. Under Cheney, therefore, the 
trial court's reliance on an affirmative defense neither 
pleaded nor argued by Rothey was error. 
Rothey also argues that the Bank was not prejudiced 
by the fact that the estoppel theory created by the trial 
court was neither pleaded nor argued by Rothey. Rothey 
claims that the Bank has not alleged "that had it understood 
the estoppel claim it would have (a) produced other evidence 
which was precluded, or (b) given other arguments which were 
not given." Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent at 22. Rothey's 
claim in this regard is difficult to fathom. Had the Bank 
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known that the trial court was going to rule based on the 
estoppel theory it created, the Bank would have argued vigor-
ously the numerous reasons why neither the facts nor the law 
support such a theory. One need only look to the bulk of the 
Bank's Brief in chief to discover the arguments the Bank 
would have made to the trial court had the Bank been on 
notice as to the theory the trial court would ultimately 
create. See Brief of Appellant-Defendant at 12-36. 
Factually, the Bank would have offered proof that, contrary 
to the trial court's findings, Rothey was reasonably advised 
of the Bank's attorney's fees. That would not have been 
difficult, since Rothey himself was counsel to Mr. Belnap in 
the Actions. The Bank's prejudice resulting from lack of 
such notice is palpable. 
Rothey's final attempt to support the trial court's 
unique estoppel theory is his argument that he and his prede-
cessors relied to their detriment on the Bank's failure to 
give notice of the disputed attorney's fees. Beyond the fact 
that neither the law nor the Trust Deed imposed a duty on the 
Bank to give such notice, (see Brief of Appellant-Defendant 
at 21-28), there was absolutely no evidence of detrimental 
reliance on the Bank's actions in this regard produced by 
Rothey at trial. The record contains no hint that Rothey or 
his predecessors in interest would have acted any differently 
than they did had the Bank notified them of its claims and 
the amounts of the disputed attorney's fees. This fact is 
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underscored when it is noticed that Rothey's Brief does not 
cite a scrap of evidence supporting his argument on this 
issue. Brief of Respondent-Plaintiff at 23-27. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that the trial court made no finding 
as to reliance. Since reliance is an essential part of any 
estoppel defense, Jones v. Department of Employment Security, 
641 P.2d 156, 161 (Utah 1982), the trial court's theory, even 
if lawful, pleaded, and at issue, must fail. 
POINT III 
THE LAW OF INDEMNITOR/INDEMNITEE IS 
A USEFUL ANALOGY IN THIS CASE 
In its Brief in chief, the Bank asserts that the 
trial court's judgment is inconsistent with applicable law 
concerning contracts of indemnity. In particular, the Bank 
demonstrates that, unless specifically required by the terms 
of the indemnification agreement itself, an indemnitee has no 
duty to notify his indemnitor that he is incurring expenses 
for which the indemnitor may ultimately be liable. Brief of 
Appellant-Defendant at 21-25. Rothey attempts to undermine 
the Bank's criticism of the trial court's unprecedented 
action by pointing out the difference between contracts of 
indemnity and the Trust Deed. Brief of Respondent-Plaintiff 
at 27-29. It is informative to note, however, that Rothey 
(a) never addresses the fact that he did not plead the exist-
ence of such a duty on the Bank's part, (b) offers absolutely 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
no case law in support of the existence of such a duty, and 
(c) fails to explain why, even if such a duty exists in the 
law, he failed to offer any proof at trial that it had been 
breached by the Bank. Nevertheless, Rothey's effort to 
explain away the cases relied upon by the Bank is not 
persuasive. 
Rothey first argues that the cases cited by the 
Bank involve situations where the indemnitor had actual 
knowledge of the facts giving rise to the claim of indemnity. 
Brief of Appellant-Defendant at 19-20. It is difficult to 
discern Rothey1s point in this regard. As the passages 
quoted in the Bank's brief make clear, these cases stand for 
the proposition that notice of the claim of indemnity need 
not be given to the indemnitor by the indemnitee. The cases 
can hardly be cited for the proposition that an indemnitor 
4 
At page 28 of his brief, Rothey states: "the rule is that 
in most situations an indemnitor is not bound by a judgment 
or settlement made by an indemnitee, and is thus not bound to 
pay the indemnity amount, unless notice and an opportunity to 
defend are first given to the indemnitor." The cases cited 
by Rothey do not support, much less state, this so-called 
rule. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co. v. Dobry Flour Mills, 211 F. 
2d 785 (10th Cir.), cert7~dehied 348 U.S. 832 (1954), and 
Dixon v. Fiat-Roosevelt Motors, Inc., 8 Wash. App. 689, 509 
P. 2d~86 (1973), are cases where the indemnitor had knowledge 
of the claim in dispute because the indemnitee actually 
requested that the indemnitor himself defend the claim in 
question. Neither case stands for the proposition that such 
a request, or even notice, is required in the absence of such 
a requirement in the contract of indemnity. 
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must have actual knowledge of the claim of indemnity in order 
for the indemnitee to recover. If that were true, the cases 
would hold that the indemnitee is bound to give notice of his 
claim to the indemnitor; a holding directly contrary to the 
actual holding of the cases. 
Rothey next argues that the foreclosure of a 
security interest in real property is an action at equity and 
that the contract principles which define the 
indemnitee/indemnitor relationship are therefore not 
applicable to this case. Brief of Respondent-Plaintiff at 
28-29. However, Rothey ignores the fact that the 
relationship between the parties to a trust deed is 
controlled by the trust deed as a matter of contract. "A 
mortgage is governed by the same rules of interpretation that 
apply to written instruments generally." Bank of Ephraim v. 
Davis, 559 P.2d 538, 540 (Utah 1977). The Trust Deed in this 
case provides that the Bank may defend against actions like 
the Actions and add costs incurred in such defense to the 
amount secured by the Trust Deed. The trial court 
specifically found this to be true. Conclusions Nos. 3 and 
4; R. 347-348. This relationship, created as a matter of 
contract by the Trust Deed, is that of indemnitor (the 
Trustor) and indemnitee (the Bank): "Indemnity may be 
defined as the obligation resting on one party to make good 
loss or damage another party has incurred." Rossmoor 
Sanitation, Inc. v. Pylon, Inc., 119 Cal. Rptr. 449, 532 P.2d 
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97, 100 (1975). Consequently, the cases cited by the Bank at 
pages 22-25 of its Brief in chief are helpful in underscoring 
the fact that neither the trial court nor Rothey have offered 
any legal support whatsoever for the unique duty created by 
the trial court to support its equally unprecedented estoppel 
theory. 
The Bank also points out that Rothey has made no 
attempt to answer the arguments set out at pages 25-28 of the 
Bank's Brief. As the Court will recall, the Bank there 
argues that the trial court's estoppel theory is ill-founded 
as well as unprecedented. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT RULE THAT THE 
BANK FAILED TO PROVE THAT IT WAS 
ENTITLED TO RECOVER ANY 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Rothey's final argument is that the judgment should 
be affirmed because the trial court concluded that the Bank 
failed to prove it was entitled to any attorney's fees in 
connection with its defense against the Actions. Rothey 
contends that the trial court found that the evidence relied 
upon by the Bank to support the amount of its claim was 
"poisoned and should be totally discounted." Brief of 
Respondent-Plaintiff at 31. Rothey concludes from this that, 
even if the trial court's estoppel theory is unsupportable, 
its judgment should stand and "a remand of this case for any 
. . . reason would be to no avail. Even if it could be shown 
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that the Bank was entitled to any fees, it has failed to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt the amount of those fees." 
Brief of Respondent-Plaintiff at 32. First and foremost, the 
trial court did not so rule — the trial court ruled only 
that a portion of the statements of the Bank's counsel 
comingled services. 
The trial court found and concluded as follows with 
respect to this claim: 
[Findings of Fact] 
5. That the Bank appeared in and 
defended each of the above-entitled 
actions and expended attorney's fees in 
connection with each action^ 
13. That commencing in 1974 counsel 
for the Bank prepared, on a periodic 
basis, statements for their services 
rendered, which statements were submitted 
to the Bank for payment and itemized the 
services performed not only for Civil 
Actions Nos. 209266 and 211151, but also 
other actions in which LeGrande L. Belnap 
was involved. The statements paid by the 
Bank and produced at trial totalled 
$31,130.49 for services rendered concern-
ing Civil Actions Nos. 209266 and 211151 
and certain other actions in which 
LeGrande Belnap was involved. 
15. That certain of the statements 
for services rendered comingled services 
rendered in connection with Civil Nos. 
211151 and 209266 with several other 
matters of litigation which the Court 
finds not to be specifically related to 
the above numbered actions and for which 
the Bank was not justified in charging 
fees pursuant to the Trust Deed which is 
the subject matter of this action. 
16. That by reason of time and the 
manner in which certain of the statements 
for attorneys' fees were drafted, the 
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Court is unable to determine what portion 
of the time listed on said statements is 
reasonable and legitimate in connection 
with Civil Nos. 211151 and 209266 and 
which is unreasonable and unrelated 
expense, 
[Conclusion of Law] 
5. That the defendant has failed to 
show that the total sum of $31,130.49 
constitutes a reasonable attorney's fee 
or that all of said fees were incurred in 
connection with any action purporting to 
affect the security of the Trust Deed, 
the title to the subject property, or the 
rights or powers of the beneficiary or 
Trustee. 
(R. 342-348) (emphasis added). 
Thus, according to the Court's own findings, the 
Bank expended attorney's fees in connection with each of the 
Actions. (Finding of Fact No. 5; R. 342). In addition, the 
Court found that "certain of the statements for services 
rendered comingled services rendered in [the Actions] with 
several other matters" and that by reason of the manner in 
which "certain of the statements" were drafted, the Court was 
unable to determine the portion of the time listed on "said 
statements" is reasonable. (Finding of Fact Nos. 15 and 16; 
R. 345-46). Thus, based upon the Court's own Findings, only 
"certain" of the statements so comingled services and only 
"certain" of the attorney's fees might be disallowed on this 
basis, even assuming that all of the Court's findings are 
adequately supported by the evidence. They are not. 
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James Lowrie testified that he was the attorney of 
record for the Bank in Civil Nos. 209266 and 211151 (the 
Actions) throughout their duration (T., 2/7/83, at 37-38; R. 
409-410). The Bank was involved in certain actions in addi-
tion to Civil Nos. 209266 and 211151. For example, case 
number Civil No. 211425 was consolidated by the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County with Civil No. 
211151. (T., 2/7/83, at 51; R. 423). Part of the subject 
matter of Civil No. 211425 was an effort to enjoin the prose-
cution of a California Superior Court case involving certain 
real estate property in California. That case will 
hereinafter be referred to as the "California Case." As a 
part of Civil No. 211425, LeGrande L. Belnap sought to enjoin 
the prosecution of the California Case. 9T., 2/7/83, at 51-
52; R. 423-24). In addition, the probate of the estate of 
Utahna P. Belnap was consolidated with Civil Nos. 211151 and 
209266. (T., 2/7/83, at 52-53; R. 424-25). As a plain 
consequence of the interrelationship of these cases, it was 
practically impossible to separate the services that were 
rendered separately with respect to each. 
Mr. Lowrie gave the Court a general summary of all 
services performed in Civil No. 209266. (T., 2/7/83, at 67-
70; R. 439-442). That description of services included the 
initial preparation of an Answer, discovery, motions, the 
trial court's dismissal with prejudice, an appeal to this 
Court, and an affirmance of the Bank's position. Mr. Lowrie 
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also described generally the services rendered by his firm to 
the Bank with respect to Civil No. 211151, beginning with the 
filing of an Answer and Counterclaim, conducting of 
discovery, the engagement of and examination of experts, 
preparations for trial, the trial court's last-minute 
granting of a Motion for Summary Judgment, an appeal to this 
Court, and an affirmance of the Bank's position. (T., 
2/7/83, at 70-81; R. 442-453). 
Mr. Lowrie then identified all of the statements 
sent by his firm to the Bank covering services rendered in 
connection with Civil Nos. 209266 and 211151. (T., 2/7/83, 
at 81 £t seq.; R. 453 ejt seq.). Exhibit 14 was received into 
evidence. (T., 2/7/83, at 85; R. 457). Mr. Lowrie reviewed 
each of the statements and testified about the services 
rendered and the amount of the time expended on each. (T., 
2/7/83, at 87 et seq.; R. 459 et seq.). In addition, Mr. 
Lowrie testified, without contradiction, as follows: 
Q. Have you reviewed your record to 
determine approximately how much time you 
personally have spent in the defense of 
the Bank in Civil No. 211151 and 209266? 
A. Well, in defense of the Bank in 
an assertion of the Counterclaim through 
the conclusion of the appeal and the 
matters I reviewed, yes, I have. 
Q. And how many hours did you 
personally spend? 
A. In excess of 455 hours. 
Q. Have you reviewed your records 
to determine the total number of hours 
spent by legal personnel in the defense 
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of the Bank in 209266, and in defense of 
. the Bank in the prosecution of the decla-
ratory judgment counterclaim in 211151? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And how many hours, in the 
aggregate, have legal personnel of Jones, 
Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough expended in 
those? 
A. In excess of 622. 
Q. And what is the range of hourly 
rates charged by the lawyers — not law 
clerks but lawyers of Jones, Waldo, 
Holbrook & McDonough for those services? 
A. Well --
Q. I realize that the statements 
reflect them but just give us a range. 
A. For Mr. Waldo, they were free. 
Otherwise they range from $35 an hour to 
$95 an hour. 
Q. Do you have an opinion as to the 
reasonableness of the fees that were 
charged to the Bank for the defense of 
the Bank in 209266 and 211151, and if the 
prosecution of the declaration judgment 
counterclaim in the latter case? 
A. Yes I do. 
Q. What is that? *** 
A. In my opinion, our fees have 
ranged from reasonable and generous to 
the Bank. 
(T., 2/7/83, at 90-92; R. 462-464). There thus exists an 
uncontroverted basis for the recovery of attorney's fees that 
does not place reliance on any of the statements of Jones, 
Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough. 
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Further, counsel for Rothey stipulated that one 
attorney, Robyn Heilbrun, expended 141.6 hours on behalf of 
the Bank in conjunction with Civil No. 209266 at a billing 
rate of between $45 and $60 per hour: 
Mr. Smith [Rothey1s counsel]: Your 
Honor, maybe we can shorten : she is 
simply going to testify to what is 
already in the statements, its there. We 
have an attorney's representation as to 
what he thinks is reasonable and how many 
hours and what was done and so forth, and 
we have been through that. Its just 
compounded, and I don't believe we need 
it. 
The Court: He's given you a man's 
perspective of that and she'll give you a 
woman's perspective. 
Mr. Smith: Probably the better 
perspective as well, but — 
Mr. Maak: We might be able to 
stipulate to a lot of this right now. If 
we will stipulate that she did what the 
statements say she did, then — 
Mr. Smith: I'll stipulate that what 
he's put down there is what she would 
testify she did, and that's — 
Ms. Heilbrun: That's the testimony 
I would proffer, Your Honor. 
Mr. Smith: I have no problem with 
that. 
Mr. Maak: And that you expended how 
many hours? 
Ms. Heilbrun: 141.6 hours myself. 
Mr. Smith: Is that in the state-
ment? 
Ms. Heilbrun: Yes. That is the 
addition of the statements. 
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Mr. Smith: We can do that. And 
that's in 209266 and 211151? 
Ms. Heilbrun: Yes. 
Mr. Maak: And your billing rate for 
this period of time was between what and 
what? 
Ms. Heilbrun: $45 and $60. 
Mr. Smith: It's certainly uncon-
scionable, but if that's what she's going 
to testify to, I have no problem. 
The Court: Is that the billing rate 
to Walker Bank and Trust Company? 
Ms. Heilbrun: Yes, Your Honor. 
Mr. Maak: And finally, that the 
charges that were made to the Bank for 
her services were a reasonable fee for 
the service that she rendered in her 
opinion? 
Mr. Smith: I think Mr. Lowrie has 
already testified to the entire fee. 
Mr. Maak: She spent a significant 
amount of time. I just wanted her to be 
here. 
Mr. Smith: I would stipulate with 
him as to what's been indicated here as 
being what her testimony would be. 
The Court: So your time was 141.6? 
Ms. Heilbrun: Through May of 1981. 
That does not include nonjudicial fore-
closure or foreclosure in this case, 
which Mr. Lowrie has testified to. 
(T., 2/7/83, at 121-125; R. 492-494)(emphasis added). Thus, 
the parties stipulated that Ms. Heilbrun would testify that 
she expended 141.6 hours at the rate of between $45 and $60 
per hour and expended 141.6 hours "in 209266 and 211151." 
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Finally, it will be remembered that the trial court 
found that only "certain of" the Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & 
McDonough firm's statements to the Bank comingled services. 
Included in the record on appeal is plaintiff's Exhibit 14, 
which consists of the statements rendered by the Jones, 
Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough firm to the Bank for this and 
other matters. Many of those statements separately itemize 
the services and charges attributable exclusively to Civil 
Nos. 209266 and 211151. The following are only illustrative. 
STATEMENT PAGE 
DATE NUMBER DESCRIPTION 
5/11/76 1 Only concerned 209266 and 211151 
9/16/76 
6/1/78 6 Concerns only 209266 
8/1/78 5 Concerns only 209266 
10/4/78 5 Concerns only 209266 
Each statement specifies the services that were 
rendered in conjunction with Belnap matters. The trial court 
had before it the court's complete files in both Civil Nos. 
209266 and 211151. (T., 2/7/83, at 25; R. 397). From those 
files, the Court can compare the dates upon which proceedings 
occurred in each of those cases and the references in the 
statements (such as preparation of brief, appearance at 
hearing, etc.) with the description of services to determine, 
with certainty, the case to which the services related. 
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In summary, the following independent evidentiary 
bases were presented to the trial court as evidence of a 
reasonable fee for services rendered by the Bank's counsel in 
conjunction with the Actions, Civil Nos. 209266 and 211151: 
First, Mr. Lowrie, the Bank's counsel, independently tes-
tified to the time expended and the range of reasonable fees 
that he charged. Second, Rothey's counsel stipulated that 
one of the Bank's counsel, Robyn Heilbrun, expended 141.6 
hours at an hourly rate of between $45 and $60 for services 
rendered in conjunction with Civil Nos. 209266 and 211151. 
Third, many of the Bank's statements do not comingle cases 
upon which services were rendered and provide an independent 
evidentiary basis for the recovery of those fees. Fourth, 
even those few statements that comingled some services could 
be divided between the various cases based upon the contents 
of the files in Civil Nos. 209266 and 211151, both of which 
were before the trial court. Fifth, Mr. Lowrie testified, 
without contradiction, that the services rendered in Civil 
Nos. 209266 and 211151 were related to other actions, which 
were consolidated with the subject cases, and that the serv-
ices rendered in conjunction with those other action were 
reasonably necessary to insure the protection of the Bank's 
interests in conjunction with Civil Nos. 209266 and 211151. 
Last, the trial court had before it Mr. Lowrie's description 
of the services that he rendered, and a file depicting the 
exact services rendered in conjunction with each case, both 
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of which provided an independent evidentiary basis upon which 
the trial court could have fixed a reasonable fee for the 
attorney's fees in question. 
This case must be remanded to the Third Judicial 
District Court of Salt Lake County for a determination of the 
amount of costs and attorney's fees due the Bank under the 
Trust Deed and for further proceedings to foreclose the Trust 
Deed. 
CONCLUSION 
Rothey's Brief fails to address or addresses inade-
quately all of the arguments made in the Bank's Brief in 
chief. First, Rothey does not deny that the trial court 
found every fact necessary to support the Bank's recovery of 
its attorney's fees and costs incurred in the Actions. 
Second, Rothey does not deny that the trial court expressly 
rejected each defense advanced by Rothey's pleadings and 
arguments. Third, Rothey's contention that he asserted the 
estoppel theory ultimately created by the trial court is 
belied by Rothey's answers to the Bank's interrogatories. 
Rothey never pleaded nor argued any theory even remotely 
resembling the theory created by the trial court, and 
Rothey's Brief does not argue to the contrary. Fourth, 
Rothey cites no law in support of the trial court's theory 
and fails to respond to the Bank's argument that that theory 
is contrary to good sense. Fifth, Rothey has not cited to 
any evidence to support the finding, essential to the trial 
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court's dispositive theory, that the Bank failed timely to 
advise Rothey or his predecessors that it claimed the subject 
fees. Sixth, Rothey does not contend that the trial court 
made any finding that Rothey or his predecessors relied in 
any respect upon the Bank's conduct. Last, Rothey's claim 
that the Bank did not prove that any attorney's fees were 
recoverable is contrary to the trial court's findings and the 
record. 
The Bank's arguments remain essentially unrebutted, 
and a plainer case for reversal cannot be conceived. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this j& day of June, 1984. 
ROOKER, LARSEljL KIMBALL & PARR 
Z. Maak, Of Counsel 
B. Green, Esq. 
Attorneys for Appellant-
Defendant 
First Interstate Bank of Utah 
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